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Transforming Maine’s Economy:
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Policy
by Catherine Searle Renault
Innovation and entrepreneurship are major drivers of economic growth. Catherine Renault suggests that support 
for them is a primary role of state government in order to increase the well-being of citizens through the provision 
of well-paying jobs that cannot be easily exported. Today, the state’s role is described as “enhancing the innovation 
ecosystem,” with the goal of increased productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. Renault outlines policies 
that can build this ecosystem, each of which is part of an overall policy environment that will support innovation 
and entrepreneurship.
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
In 1987, Robert M. Solow was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on the theory of 
economic growth. Using computers newly available for 
economic research in the 1950s, Solow looked at the 
growth of various economies in the world, expecting to 
confirm the Keynesian theory that growth was related 
to the labor and capital in a given country. Much to 
his surprise, labor and capital explained only a small 
portion of the observed growth. Researchers (Romer 
1986, 1990) eventually concluded, and subsequent 
research has confirmed, that as much as 80 percent of 
economic growth is due to new knowledge, specifically 
new knowledge that has been brought to the market—
innovation.
We each have our own experiences of this phenom-
enon. Think about the impact of Google on our 
everyday lives and our country’s economy. Fifteen years 
ago, Google was just an idea in the mind of two grad-
uate students, Sergey Brins and Larry Page. Today, it is a 
$50 million revenue company with over 42,000 
employees. Its products are so ubiquitous that we regu-
larly use their company name as a verb, as in, “Did you 
Google that?”
The Internet is another illustration of the impact of 
innovation on economic growth. The Boston Consulting 
Group calculates the Internet contributes more than 4.7 
percent of our nation’s economy, more than the federal 
government (Dean et al. 2012). Twenty-five years ago, 
the technology that became the Internet was the back-
bone of ARPANET, a Department of Defense network 
for the sharing of research findings. It wasn’t until it was 
turned loose as a commercial network in the mid-1990s 
that the Internet exploded into the phenomenon that 
we have today.
This pattern has been repeated many times and not 
just with technologies, although the application of new 
scientific and technical knowledge has enabled many 
improvements in productivity that have accelerated 
growth. Remember when it took days to send packages 
to each other, and important documents were mailed or 
faxed? FedEx exploited the opportunity by marrying 
advanced logistics with a consumer focus and promising 
prompt delivery “when it absolutely, positively has to be 
there overnight.” A business model innovation as much 
as a technical innovation, FedEx changed the way we do 
business. 
Innovations in medicine, in energy, in the consumer 
space, all drive our economy. And to a large extent, these 
innovations come out of entrepreneurial companies. It is 
estimated that firms that went public in the 1980s and 
1990s accounted for 40 percent of employment in 
publicly traded companies in 2000 (Davis et al. 2007; 
Davis and Kahn 2008).
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
While it may seem obvious that supporting innova-tion and entrepreneurship is essential to driving 
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economic growth, many in the United States have 
derided policies to do just that as industrial policy. 
Often framed as “picking winners and losers,” industrial 
policy is considered as unwarranted involvement by 
government in a free market. Since the free market is 
perfect, this theory goes, government should not get 
involved. 
There are three problems with this argument. First, 
most governments around the world are managing their 
innovation economies to a far greater level than would 
ever be contemplated here. In China, entire cities have 
been built around new universities and industrial 
complexes. The European Union is explicitly supporting 
“industrial policy that will put the EU economy on a 
dynamic growth path strengthening EU competitive-
ness, providing growth and jobs, and enabling the tran-
sition to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy” 
(European Commission 2010: 4).
The second problem with the free-market, anti-
industrial policy position is that there are numerous 
instances where the free market is not in fact fully effi-
cient. There are substantial information asymmetries, 
meaning that not all entrepreneurs or innovators have 
the same information. And most importantly, innova-
tion, and the basic research that underlies it, is a public 
good, shared by all citizens. Left to themselves, single 
firms and individuals will underinvest in research and 
development (R&D). Free markets will not produce the 
correct amount of innovation and growth. 
The third problem with the industrial policy red 
herring is that the U.S. government has in fact been 
doing industrial policy for years. It is government 
funding that produced the Internet, radar, lasers, shale 
oil drilling methods, and numerous other technologies 
that are the underpinnings of today’s economy.
Therefore, there is a role for government in investing 
in R&D at a level that increases innovation, productivity, 
and growth for all. Furthermore, there is a role for 
government in providing training and information so 
that all entrepreneurs and innovators have the opportu-
nity to compete on a level playing field.
THE ROLE OF STATES
In this discussion about the role of government, there is a distinction between the role of federal and state 
governments. As a general rule, the federal government 
cedes to the states programs that deal directly with 
individual firms and with regional initiatives, citing 
the states’ abilities to directly respond to local condi-
tions. In turn, the states leave to the federal govern-
ment the support of basic research and research that 
supports national priorities such as defense, health, and 
agriculture. In practice, these national needs are met 
by partnerships between the federal government and 
universities, including many state institutions, so the 
lines of responsibility are blurred.
But, since World War II, when Vannevar Bush 
(Hart 1998) articulated the importance of continued 
federal support of research, and the National Science 
Foundation was created, government has funded a large 
portion of basic research in this country. Since the early 
1980s, however, the states have taken an increasingly 
active position in science- and technology-based 
economic development, filling in the blanks left by the 
federal government’s avoidance of industrial policy and 
trying to produce increased economic growth for their 
citizens.
Today, the state’s role is described as “enhancing the 
innovation ecosystem,” with the goal of increased 
productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. The 
ecosystem model is relatively recent, having been articu-
lated less than 10 years ago by Iansiti and Levien who 
postulated: “There are certainly strong parallels between 
business networks and biological ecosystems. Both are 
characterized by a large number of loosely intercon-
nected participants that depend on one another for their 
effectiveness and survival” (2004: 5). Supporting this 
ecosystem has come to mean four things: (1) building 
and supporting a state’s research and development 
capacity; (2) encouraging a state’s entrepreneurial 
community; (3) increasing the productivity of a state’s 
economy though the commercialization of new prod-
ucts, services, processes, business models and marketing 
strategies; and (4) supporting sectors and/or clusters. 
Each of these is part of an overall policy environment 
that will support innovation and entrepreneurship, 
leading to economic growth.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY
While not all innovation is based on technology, many new ideas have come from R&D in science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
disciplines. And it is now better understood that inno-
vation and creativity flourish in open, collaborative 
environments such as universities, R&D laboratories, 
and research-oriented companies like Apple and Google 
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(Johnson 2010). Therefore, states support and build 
their R&D capacity. There is a distinction, however, 
between public and private research and development 
capacity. It takes different methods to encourage the two.
R&D Tax Credit: An Incentive for  
Private Research and Development
Since it is clear that companies that do R&D are far 
more likely to innovate than others, best practice in 
supporting private R&D is the use of the R&D tax 
credit. Atkinson (2010) models the impact of increases 
in federal and state R&D tax credits and found that the 
increased economic activity from a 6 percent increase in 
the federal credit would exceed the loss of tax revenues 
in 15 years. Atkinson and Andes (2008) suggest that 
states should link their tax credits to the federal credit, 
allowing firms to take the higher amount. While the 
federal government R&D tax credit has been in statute 
for more than 30 years, it is still not permanent. 
In addition, most of the states have an R&D tax 
credit (Miller and Richard 2010). The state tax credit 
has been widely studied by economists and has been 
found to be effective in increasing R&D spending. For 
instance, Wu (2008) found that the existence of a state 
R&D tax credit has a positive and significant effect on 
the number of high-technology establishments in a state. 
However, it also appears that corporations decide where 
to conduct their R&D based on the size of the credit, so 
the credit affects location decisions (Wilson 2007).
Maine has three R&D tax credits. Taken together, 
they are used by a small number of companies, and 
according to the Maine Revenue Service, cost Maine 
taxpayers $5.5 million in lost revenue in FY13. The 
research expenditure tax credit was used by 85 taxpayers; 
the super credit by 70; and the high-technology credit 
by 60. However, it is not known how many companies 
use more than one credit. A study conducted ten years 
ago on the Maine R&D tax credit concluded that the 
legislature should consider whether Maine’s small firms 
are able to use the credits as well as large firms and 
whether changes should be made to expand their appli-
cability and therefore their effectiveness (Luger, Feller, 
and Renault 2004). Other states allow transferability of 
credits, meaning that small companies performing 
R&D that is pre-revenue, and therefore without a tax 
liability, can sell their credits to others, thereby mone-
tizing the credit. Another concept is having credits that 
are refundable, meaning that firm can get cash refunds 
if the credits exceed their tax liability. 
Building Public Research and 
Development Capacity
In addition to funding R&D activities directly in the 
states through competitive grant programs, federal agen-
cies, such as the National Science Foundation, National 
Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, and 
Department of Defense, fund capacity building in the 
states through grants for new laboratories and equipment. 
The rationale is actually a national security argument—
that it is important that the country’s R&D capacity be 
broad-based and not too geographically centralized. One 
program that has been important to Maine is EPSCoR 
(Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive 
Research), which supports R&D capacity expansion in 
the states that receive smaller amounts of competitive 
federal funds. Through the EPSCoR program, Maine has 
built its Advanced Structures and Composites Laboratory, 
the Laboratory for Surface Science and Technology, and 
the Forest Bioproducts Research Institute (all at the 
University of Maine). EPSCoR requires state support in 
the form of a match, as well as a strategic plan for science 
and technology and an EPSCoR committee. Maine 
statute gives these responsibilities to the Maine Innovation 
Economy Advisory Board. 
Since the 1980s, many states have also been 
investing heavily in building their R&D capacity. 
Popular programs include funding for new laboratories 
and equipment and attracting “star” scientists. The 
latter, exemplified by the Georgia Research Alliance 
Eminent Scholars program, endows chairs for new 
professors in fields deemed critical for a state’s economy. 
Since its inception in 1990, Georgia has invested in 
more than 65 eminent scholars, resulting in over 6,000 
new jobs, 300 new companies, and thousands of new 
scientific discoveries. 
While Maine has not gone in the direction of 
attracting this type of talent, the state’s colleges, universi-
ties, and nonprofit laboratories all report difficulties 
with the recruitment and support of senior faculty due 
Since the 1980s, many states  
have also been investing heavily  
in building their R&D capacity.
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to lack of funds. In response, Maine’s 2010 Science and 
Technology Plan called for investments to “attract and 
keep high-quality researchers and graduate students who 
can win competitive federal research grants” (MIEACB 
2009: 13). However, the trend to cut investments in 
R&D over the past decade has curtailed the develop-
ment of new programs such as this one.
Maine’s strategy since the mid-1990s has been to 
invest in laboratories and equipment. A series of bonds, 
initiated by Governors King and Baldacci, approved by 
the legislature, and supported by the public, have been 
used to build new research facilities at the University of 
Maine, the University of New England, and at nonprofit 
research organizations in the state. These investments 
have been episodic and uneven (Figure 1), however, 
despite more than ten years of evidence that they have 
paid off for Maine taxpayers. Many commentators, from 
the 2006 Brookings report to the annual R&D evalua-
tions, have called for a planned, level, and sustained 
investment in this type of funding.1 
Since bond funding is only appropriate for building 
long-term assets such as laboratories and equipment, 
other annual General Fund appropriations are also 
needed to support basic research by providing the 
matching funds needed by the research institutions to 
win competitive and EPSCoR federal funding. Since the 
late 1990s, this has come through a line item in the 
budget called the Maine Economic Improvement Fund 
(MEIF). While this budget item has stayed relatively 
stable at around $14,700,000 for the last five years, an 
increase in MEIF funding would have direct effects on 
an influx of further federal research funding and subse-
quent spillover effects. 
One important caveat is that appropriate tech-
nology-transfer policies and procedures at the colleges, 
universities, and nonprofit laboratories in the state is 
also critical, so that discoveries made in these laborato-
ries can be protected, licensed, and commercialized. 
Without this critical link, the state’s investment in 
R&D will be considerably less effective. The Maine 
Technology Asset Fund, for instance, the program oper-
ated by the Maine Technology Institute (MTI) that 
dispersed the last two bond investments, has required 
recipients to work hard to develop technology-transfer 
policies that encourage commercialization of new 
discoveries here in Maine. 
BUILD 
ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CAPACITY
Most countries and states have programs and 
policies designed to support 
small businesses and entre-
preneurs. These programs 
are ubiquitous because all 
places have dramatically 
more small businesses than 
large businesses and because 
small businesses create jobs.
The latter assertion 
turns out to be somewhat 
misleading, and economists 
have been trying to sort out 
the data for years. Starting 
with David Birch’s research 
in the 1980s into gazelles 
or rapidly growing compa-
nies, there has been substan-
tial interest in the type of 
firms that create the most 
Figure 1: Maine’s Investments in Innovation, 1996 to 2013
Source: Biennial budget data, compiled by PolicyOne Associates and Innovation Policyworks LLC.
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economic growth. For instance, the Small Business 
Administration sponsored research in 2007 that found 
that increasing small business births by 5 percent would 
result in a small increase on Gross State Product (Bruce 
et al. 2007). Acs, Parsons, and Tracy (2008) found that 
high-impact firms are relatively old, rare, and contribute 
to the majority of economic growth. These authors 
suggest that the best economic development strategy is 
to focus scarce resources on cultivating high-growth 
firms, rather than entrepreneurship overall. In contrast, 
Breitzman and Hicks (2008) found that small firms 
were a significant source of innovation and patent 
activity, developing more patents per employee than 
larger businesses, with more significant patents as 
measured by citations and originality. 
More recently, economists have parsed the data 
further to discover that the real issue is not the size of the 
firm, but its age that matters. Stangler and Litan (2009) 
looked at 2007 Census data to discover that firms that 
are between one and five years old account for roughly 
two-thirds of job creation. But, the picture is actually 
more nuanced than that. Haltwinger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda (2010) have done the most careful statistical 
study of the issue and conclude that startups are critical 
to economic growth, but also that they are the most 
volatile. That is, startups are responsible for the majority 
of job growth and job destruction. However, if a young 
firm survives, it will tend to grow faster than its more 
mature small counterparts. So, while public policies 
should support rapidly growing young firms, policy-
makers should also understand that many will fail.
Another piece of this dynamic is that there are many 
types of entrepreneurs, and not all require the same, or 
perhaps any, public interventions. Steve Blank, a Stanford 
professor widely known for his work in entre-
preneurship, says there are six types of entrepre-
neurs.2 Blank describes lifestyle startups, small 
business startups, scalable startups, buyable 
startups, large company startups, and social 
startups. Entrepreneurs start all of these, but 
they are quite different. Lifestyle entrepreneurs 
work to live their passion, while small business 
entrepreneurs work to feed their families. 
Scalable startups are born to be big, and like 
Google, Skype, Facebook, and Twitter, are built 
on visions of changing the world and growing 
rapidly (Figure 2). Buyable startups are born to 
flip according to Blank, meaning that they are 
built completely with the intention of being 
sold to larger companies. This structure is popular in the 
Internet and biosciences sectors. Large company startups 
are usually new divisions designed to facilitate entry into 
a new product or business while social entrepreneurs are 
focused on making the world a better place, rather than 
creating wealth.
Aulet and Murray found that there are different 
types of entrepreneurs, those who are innovation-driven 
vs those small and medium enterprises that serve local 
markets with “traditional, well-understood business 
ideas and limited competitive advantage” (2013: 4). 
They point out that the small and medium enterprises 
can be important in their local communities and form 
the majority of employment. But, like Blanks’ small 
business entrepreneurs, their intention is primarily to 
stay small. So, in a world where public investments are 
by necessity limited, small and medium enterprises have 
less leverage on the economy than do innovation-driven 
entrepreneurs. The authors conclude: “If job creation 
and economic prosperity are the goals for a government, 
[innovation-driven] entrepreneurship must be a major 
element of government strategy and policymaking” 
(Aulet and Murray 2013: 9).
To what extent is this direction appropriate for a 
rural state such as Maine? Do we have innovation-driven 
entrepreneurs? The answer is emphatically “yes.” Experts 
in rural economic development say (Markley and Stark 
2009: 1), 
 Entrepreneurship development can be a Triple Bottom 
Line development strategy. By helping entrepreneurs…
to recognize opportunities and build new ventures, 
communities can experience improvements in the 
economy, the environment, and the diversity of resi-
dents actively participating in civic life.
Figure 2:  Scalable Entrepreneurs
Source: steveblank.com
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Another controversy in the entrepreneurship litera-
ture is whether entrepreneurs are born or made, that is, 
can you train someone to be an entrepreneur? The 
answer seems to be that entrepreneurship is quite oppor-
tunistic; people respond to opportunities that they see 
and become entrepreneurs without really planning on it 
(e.g., Aldrich and Martinez 2001). On the other hand, a 
Babson College study found that students who took two 
electives on entrepreneurship in college were signifi-
cantly more likely to start a company upon graduation 
(Lange et al. 2011).
MAINE’S SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEURS
In Maine the commitment to entrepreneurship support, especially scalable entrepreneurs or innovation-driven 
entrepreneurs, has been limited. The Applied Technology 
Development Centers program was started in 1999 with 
the legislature creating seven incubators focused on 
the seven technology sectors, also legislatively defined. 
The legislature also defined where each of the incuba-
tors would be located, without any data about actual 
concentrations of firms in the sectors. For instance, the 
biotechnology incubator, now closed, was located in 
Fairfield, far from either the Jackson Laboratory or the 
resources at the University of Maine in Orono or the 
southern Maine bioscience assets at the University of 
New England or the IDEXX-based group of bioscience 
companies around Portland. The legislature has also cut 
the funds to this line item time and time again. In this 
fiscal year, the total is down to only $178,838. 
However, both the MTI and the Blackstone 
Foundation have recognized the importance of investing 
in Maine’s scalable entrepreneurs, and their grants have 
recently supported the remaining incubator/accelerator 
programs in the state: the Maine Center for 
Entrepreneurial Development, the Target Technology 
Center at Orono, and the Maine Aquaculture Innovation 
Center. These three programs have banded together to 
provide substantially improved services statewide to 
train scalable entrepreneurs through programs such as 
Top Gun and Top Gun Prep. 
At the same time, a number of private events have 
emerged across the country such as Start-up Weekend 
and various business plan competitions that continue to 
prime the pump by encouraging and challenging entre-
preneurs, young and old, to think big.
Across the country, many colleges and universities 
now teach entrepreneurship and some K–12 programs 
have been created to introduce entrepreneurial concepts 
early on. In Maine, these programs are few and far 
between, with the primary example being the Foster 
Center for Student Innovation at the University of 
Maine and its Innovation Engineering curriculum that 
has been rolled out to some of the other campuses of the 
University of Maine System. 
POLICIES TO SUPPORT PRODUCTIVITY 
AND COMPETIVENESS IMPROVEMENTS
There are only three ways to increase economic growth: increase the number of workers, increase 
productivity, or growth in high-productivity indus-
tries. Productivity means economic output per unit of 
input. The unit of input can be an hour of labor or 
some combination of labor, equipment, and energy. So, 
increasing the number of workers increases the size of 
an economy, but doesn’t necessarily increase the average 
wage of a worker in that economy. On the other hand, 
when all sectors become more productive, prosperity is 
more evenly shared. The third way to increase growth 
is called the “shift effect.” When an economy loses low-
productivity jobs and gains high-productivity jobs, the 
overall economy grows, but there are clearly winners 
and losers.
According to Atkinson (2013: 5), “the lion’s share of 
productivity growth…comes…from all industries, even 
low-productivity ones, boosting their productivity.” But, 
he also describes the competitiveness of an economy as 
“the ability of a region to export more in value added 
terms that it imports” (Atkinson 2013: 2). So, innovation 
can increase competitiveness by increasing the ability of 
firms to export (outside the region) and increase produc-
tivity through the application of better processes, 
increased use of equipment, and energy efficiency. 
State-level policies designed to support innovation 
in firms enable access to new technologies, or support 
innovation, adoption, and commercialization. Scarce 
state resources, however, should be focused primarily on 
firms that are exporting, or plan to export, products 
outside the region or the country, the traded sector. 
These firms bring new money into the economy, rather 
than recirculating monies that are already there.
Increasing Access to New Innovations
One of the most imperfect markets is the market for 
information, especially information about new innova-
tions. While thousands of new patents are issued each 
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year, it is difficult to access to those patents and other 
innovations that are never publicly revealed. Not only 
are the numbers overwhelming, but much competitive 
advantage is maintained through secrecy, so even with 
the Internet, it is difficult to discover what technologies 
and innovations might be available to improve the 
productivity of a particular firm. 
This problem is especially acute when it comes to 
technologies created at our nation’s colleges and univer-
sities. The transfer of technologies from research institu-
tions into organizations capable of commercializing 
them is challenging, overly bureaucratic, and legalistic, 
but incredibly necessary. Reforms have been suggested 
(Renault et al. 2008; Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy 2007) 
and some universities have recently instituted radical 
changes. For instance, the University of New Hampshire 
has created UNH Innovation, which “comprises 
licensing; services such as the InterOperability Lab and 
equipment or facilities rentals; and ventures and 
economic development” (UNH press release October 
29, 2013). There are plans to create a mentorship 
program and increased opportunities for students to 
work directly with businesses. In a press release 
announcing the new organization), Jan Nisbet, senior 
vice provost for research at UNH, said, “This creates a 
clear path into the university if you’re interested in our 
technology, our equipment, and our expertise. 
Centralizing our efforts to commercialize the university’s 
intellectual assets will allow us to promote and partici-
pate in local economic development as well as diversify 
revenue streams beyond just licensing income.”
In some states, there has been a concerted attempt 
to deal with the problem that technologies created in 
universities and other research organizations require a 
great of additional work before they are ready to be 
licensed and commercialized. This work is often referred 
to as translational research, and new centers are 
appearing at leading universities to bridge the gaps 
between the laboratory bench and the factory floor. A 
leading example is the Despande Center at MIT. The 
center awards research grants and provides other types 
of assistance to MIT faculty whose work shows the 
potential to benefit society, transform markets and 
industries, and improve the quality of life for people 
across the globe. 
A related issue is the appropriate protection, through 
patenting, trademarks or copyrights, or intellectual 
property developed by companies. In Maine, a program 
called the Patent Program, located at the University of 
Maine School of Law, has been operating since 1999. 
The mission of the program is to support economic 
development by helping Maine inventors and small 
businesses to understand how to identify and protect 
their intellectual property. The program, however, suffers 
from the issues discussed earlier, in that it does not 
discriminate between companies with the ability to scale 
their innovations and people for whom invention is a 
hobby. In addition, funding for this program has also 
been declining for over a decade, and it does not have 
the resources to meet the demand for its services. In 
March 2014, the law school announced that the 
program is being cut, due to budget constraints,
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION: ACCESS TO CAPITAL
There are two big hurdles to the adoption and commercialization of new innovations by compa-
nies, startups, or existing firms: capital and know-how. 
Most states now offer a variety of programs to deal with 
access to capital; a few, such as Maine, also encourage 
and teach the process of commercialization.
Access to capital for technology adoption is 
primarily access to equity capital. Sources of debt, like 
banks, are typically uneasy with the process of adoption 
of new technology because there is by definition no 
track record to go on. Therefore, the high-risk profile of 
technology adoption and commercialization is more 
suited to the high-return profile of equity capital. The 
type of capital required depends entirely on where the 
innovation is in its product life cycle. Figure 3 shows a 
typical product life cycle and the types of capital that are 
appropriate at various stages of development.
Early, prerevenue, funding, often referred to as the 
“valley of death,” is not easily obtained in private markets. 
There are two big hurdles to the 
adoption and commercialization  
of new innovations by companies, 
startups, or existing firms: capital 
and know-how.
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY
44    MAINE POLICY REVIEW    Winter/Spring 2014 View current & previous issues of MPR at: digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/
Therefore, many states have instituted public programs 
that support projects at this stage of development, essen-
tially betting that some of the projects will be successful 
and yield increased follow-on investment and successful, 
growing companies. In Maine, the programs are admin-
istered by the MTI, and funded annually through a 
General Fund appropriation. Since its inception in 1999, 
MTI has invested over $105 million in 1,300 tech-
nology projects and has documented a return to Maine 
taxpayers of 14:1. 
Following prerevenue grant programs, many states 
also support matching funds for federal programs aimed 
at translational research and commercialization, notably 
Small Business Innovation Research funds. Again, 
Maine’s version of this program is housed at MTI, and 
has been demonstrated to be successful in increasing the 
win-rate of Maine companies who apply to this extremely 
competitive program. Matching funds for Small Business 
Innovation Research awards increases the amount of 
federal funds flowing to small, innovative firms in the 
state and increases their likelihood of finding follow-on 
capital and ultimately commercializing their products.3
Often angels, private investors with a high net 
worth who invest in early-stage firms, are active in states 
supporting innovative companies. In Maine, a group 
called Maine Angels, made up of individual investors, 
meets regularly to review investment opportunities. 
Generally, angel groups are private, although in many 
ecosystems like Maine’s, the angels are an integral part of 
the fabric that supports entrepreneurs with innovative 
ideas. Some states organize angel groups, but their 
operation is generally privately led.
Many states, however, see a public purpose in 
encouraging angel investment. Therefore, they have tax 
credits aimed at lowering the risk associated with these 
early-stage investments. Like the R&D tax credits previ-
ously discussed, so-called seed-stage tax credits have 
been shown to be effective in increasing angel invest-
ments, leading to greater sustainability and growth of 
innovation-based companies. 
Maine’s Seed Capital Tax Credit is one of the oldest 
in the country, dating back to 1990. Since 2002, the 
credit has been helped create 1,800 jobs and maintain 
another 5,000. It has recently been extensively reviewed 
by the legislature and extended past its original $30 
million statutory cap. Unfortunately, the bill to extend 
the credit ran into the budgetary realities in the 2012–13 
legislative session, and as a result, there was no credit in 
2013, and the amounts available will be 
limited in the years thereafter. 
This is in stark contrast to other 
states that have more broadly supported 
similar programs. For instance, in New 
Jersey in 2013 Gov. Chris Christie (R) 
signed into law a $25 million angel 
investor tax credit program to encourage 
early investment in emerging busi-
nesses. The program provides tax credits 
for up to 10 percent of a qualified 
investment in businesses with fewer 
than 225 employees that conduct 
research, manufacturing, or technology 
commercialization. 
Following angel funding, the next 
step closer to commercialization for 
innovation-driven and/or scalable 
companies is venture funding. For that 
reason, most states have some form of a 
state venture capital fund that invests in 
relatively high-risk, high-reward firms. 
In the past year, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury has added significant funding 
to these state venture funds through a 
Figure 3: Types of Capital Appropriate for Stages of a Company’s  
 Development
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$1.5 billion program called the State Small Business 
Credit Initiative. Venture capital is a highly effective 
method for accelerating scalable enterprises and is cred-
ited with producing 21 percent of the nation’s current 
economy, 11.9 million jobs (IHS Global Insight 2011). 
Maine’s fund, Maine Venture Fund (formerly 
known as the Small Enterprise Growth Fund) was 
formed in the mid-1990s with a state investment in the 
form of a bond. It received additional funding in 2010. 
The fund, a nonprofit, is operated as an evergreen fund, 
which means that profits from investments are put back 
into the fund to invest in other companies. Since its 
inception, the Maine Venture Fund has invested $13.4 
million in 45 Maine companies.
A final type of access to capital is less glamorous, 
but nevertheless critical to supporting the adoption of 
new technology, especially by more mature firms. This 
comes in the form of tax credits for the purchase of new 
equipment and training of workers. Many states allow 
companies to deduct these expenses and/or give explicit 
tax credits against property taxes. The latter is used in 
Maine, as part of the BETR/BETE system of business 
equipment tax relief. However, the program is regularly 
raided by the legislature to balance the budget, and often 
companies will only be able to claim a percentage of the 
credit: in 2013, the amount was only 60 percent. The 
credit for business equipment purchases is extremely 
controversial in Maine, largely because many large 
national companies take advantage of it and are widely 
believed not to require such assistance from Maine 
taxpayers. A solution more closely aligned with innova-
tion policies would be to have business equipment tax 
credits associated with companies that have patents or 
exports, or no property taxes on companies that invest 
more than 15 percent of their revenues in research and 
development. 
Innovation Engineering
Last, the know-how associated with the process of 
technology commercialization is another information 
asymmetry—some firms know how to do it and others 
do not. Therefore, providing technical assistance to firms 
to increase the likelihood of commercialization is consis-
tent with supporting an innovation-based economic 
growth strategy. For most companies, innovation is a 
luxury, something to be attended to when all other 
activities are complete. But, to benefit from the strategy 
of never-ending innovation, companies need to have a 
system for innovation. In Maine, many companies are 
implementing Innovation Engineering, a system for 
innovation developed by University of Maine alumnus 
Doug Hall. The University of Maine’s Foster Center, the 
Maine Manufacturing Extension Partnership, Maine 
Center for Entrepreneurial Development, and MTI are 
all supporting the rollout of Innovation Engineering as 
a replicable system for increasing the speed of innova-
tion, while reducing the risk.4
SUPPORTING CLUSTERS
For 15 years, clusters have been the buzzword in economic development. Popularized by Harvard 
professor Michael Porter, cluster theory suggests that 
regions have strengths not just in a single sector, but 
also in the intersection of a number of sectors that 
share workforce, educational, and research assets, as 
well as support services. Examples frequently cited are 
the wine making cluster in California’s Napa Valley 
or the biotechnology cluster in Research Triangle 
Park, North Carolina. In the latter, there are medical 
schools and research laboratories, pharmaceutical 
companies, biotechnology startups, as well as manufac-
turing companies that specialize in packaging for drugs, 
testing firms that do FDA-compliant protocols for 
drugs under development, venture capitalists, attorneys, 
and advertising agencies, all with particular expertise in 
biotechnology. 
From a political point of view, supporting the devel-
opment of a cluster is more palatable than working with 
a single company, as it avoids the appearance of picking 
winners and losers and spreads the risk substantially. 
From a policy point of view, cluster programs have 
suffered a bad reputation nationally because practically 
every state has declared that it has a biotechnology 
cluster, thus making the distinction meaningless. 
In Maine, the MTI has invested from time to time 
in cluster-development activities. This program is 
currently under review amid concerns that MTI has 
spread its funds too thin and invested in some sectors 
that are too small to become sustainable. 
FINAL THOUGHTS
Outside Maine, the state is considered to be a leader in innovation-based economic development, and 
the MTI in particular has been recognized for some of 
its programs. This leadership comes from Maine’s broad 
array of programs, even though the total funding from 
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the state is modest compared to that of other states, 
whether in actual dollars or on a per capita basis. 
This leadership position is also due to the long-
standing evaluation of Maine’s R&D investment, started 
in 1999, and until recently, performed annually. 
Evaluations such as the one done in Maine inform the 
legislature about the effectiveness of state investments in 
meeting strategic economic development goals and the 
efficiency of the programs in leveraging state monies to 
gain new private investment. Ongoing evaluation is 
critical not only to transparency and accountability of 
state investment, but is also essential to improving the 
delivery of the programs themselves. 
Innovation is a primary role of state government. It 
is a major driver of economic growth and the ability of 
the state to increase the well-being of its citizens through 
the provision of well-paying, nonexportable jobs. 
Innovation, like economic development and education, 
is so essential that many states are now housing their 
innovation policy advisors in the governor’s office, rather 
than in an agency or department. In Maine, the Office 
of Innovation is in the Department of Economic and 
Community Development and is currently staffed by a 
long-time traditional economic developer, rather than 
by an expert in technology-based economic develop-
ment. In the future, innovation policy needs to be 
elevated to a level that is consistent with its importance 
to the state’s future.  -
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